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Abstract
Quick and accurate detection of cyber attack is key to the normal operation of the smart grid system.
In this paper, a joint state estimation and sequential attack detection method for a given bus with grid
frequency drift is proposed that utilizes the commonly monitored output voltage. In particular, based on
a non-linear state-space model derived from the three-phase sinusoidal voltage equations, we employ
the sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) filtering to estimate the system state. The output of the SMC filter is
fed into a CUSUM test to detect the attack in a fastest way. Moreover, an adaptive sampling strategy is
proposed to reduce the rate of taking measurements and communicating with the controller. Extensive
simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method achieves high adaptivity and efficient detection
of various types of attacks in power systems.
Index Terms
Smart grid, attack detection, sequential Monte Carlo, state estimation, change detection, CUSUM
test, adaptive sampling.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid transforms the legacy power grid that provides a one-way centrally generated
power flow to end users into a more distributed and dynamic system of two-way flow of power
and information [1]. In a large-scale power system, the increased connectivity and communication
load lead to severe security challenges arising from physical faults and malicious attacks. The
occurrence of cyber attacks can result in energy loss and safety concerns [2] [3]. Therefore, there
is an urgent need for effective and economical mechanisms to detect structured attacks and to
safeguard the smart grid.
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2A. Related Works
Typical attacks interfere with the data communication in a smart grid system by jamming the
channel, injecting malicious data, etc. To protect the smart grid from external attacks, existing
approaches include early anomaly detection methods that identify faulty events in advance [4]
[5], encryption and authentication schemes adopted from Internet communications [6]–[8], and
control-theoretic methods based on the state estimation [9]–[14]. Here, we focus on the control-
theoretic methods, considering the limitations of the first two approaches, e.g., heavy dependence
on numerous feedback reports and continuous calibration of the whole system, computational
and communication requirements beyond the ability of local devices.
A general control-theoretic approach is to jointly deploy an estimator and a detector. The
estimator utilizes the actual measurement readings to “predict” the system state, and the detector
triggers the alarm when the estimated states deviate from the actual ones. In [9], the authors
propose to detect data injection attacks by tracking the dynamics of measurement variations
represented by the Kullback-Leibler distances between adjacent steps. [10] adopts the Kalman
filter to estimate the state variables when the grid frequency is constant, and proposes a Euclidean
detector to cope with sophisticated injection attack. [11] focuses on the state estimation and
detection of unobservable sparse data injection attacks. Machine learning methods have also
been proposed to decide whether a given measurement is normal or attacked, while its accuracy
is heavily dependent on the quality of training data. In particular, [12] presents a method using
a trained distributed support vector machine. The approach in [13] exploits the relationships
between statistical and geometric properties of the training data to learn the pattern of attacks.
In [14], the online deep learning technique is employed to extract the features of attacks from
the historical measurements and detect the attack in real-time.
Note that most of these existing state estimation methods are based on the assumption that
the whole system is ideally balanced and synchronized (e.g., matched constant frequency) under
normal operation, which is not always the case in real applications [15]. Moreover, existing
works do not consider the cost of local samplings and data communications with the controller
associated with attack detection.
B. Contributions
We develop a joint state estimation and attack detection framework for a given bus in the
smart grid, utilizing the sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) method to track the non-linear state-
November 15, 2017 DRAFT
3space model of a bus with frequency drift, and the CUSUM change detector for attack detection
based on the state estimation. Exploiting historical observations, we further propose an adaptive
sampling strategy such that the controller maintains a large sampling interval when the system
is believed to be normal and quickly reduces the interval when the attack is considered likely.
The adaptive sampling strategy efficiently reduces the rate of taking local measurements, while
the detection delay performance is almost unaffected. Extensive simulation results demonstrate
that even with the adaptive sampling strategy, our proposed method can quickly detect various
attacks in a smart grid with high efficiency and adaptivity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system models
under both normal and attacked conditions, and presents the problem formulation. In Section
III, we present the proposed state estimation and attack detection algorithm, as well as the
adaptive sampling strategy. In Section IV, the proposed method is applied in a simulated power
grid system and its performance is compared with the extended-Kalman-filter-based estimation
method in [15] and conventional detection rules in [10]. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We begin by presenting the state-space model under the normal operation, and then specify
the measurement models for several typical attacks in a real operating grid followed by the
problem statement.
We consider a discrete-time state-space model for a power system. Let x(k) and y(k) denote
the state and measurement vectors at the kth sampling instant, respectively. Then we have the
following general state-space model:
x(k + 1) = f(x(k),Δt(k)) +w(k), (1)
y(k) = h(x(k),Δt(k)) + v(k), (2)
where f(·) is the state transition function, h(·) is the measurement function, Δt(k) is the time
interval between the kth and the (k+1)th samples, w(k) is the process noise vector, and v(k) is
the measurement noise vector. In the following subsections, detailed models under both normal
and faulty conditions are presented.
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4A. Model under Normal Conditions
For power system monitoring, sensors or meters are deployed to take measurements at various
locations over time. Typically, these meters can send the measurement data (e.g., bus voltage) to
a central controller via wired or wireless communication. In particular, we derive the state-space
model based on the power grid voltage signal. The three-phase voltage signal at a given bus can
be described by [16],
Va(t) = Va cos(tω + φa) + ea(t), (3)
Vb(t) = Vb cos(tω + φb) + eb(t), (4)
Vc(t) = Vc cos(tω + φc) + ec(t), (5)
where t denotes the continuous time; Vi and φi denote the voltage amplitude and the initial
phase angle of signal i ∈ {a, b, c}; ω = 2πf0 where f0 is typically equal to 50Hz or 60Hz. Note
that, in practice, power systems are subject to frequency variation, e.g., f0 varies from 60Hz to
61Hz. The additive noise ei(t) is modeled by a white zero-mean Gaussian process. Note that in
an ideally balanced power system, Va = Vb = Vc, and φb = φa − 23π, φc = φa + 23π.
We transform the noise-free signals in (3)-(5) into the α-β reference frame using Clarke
transformation [16], i.e.,
[Vα(t), Vβ(t)]
T ! T [Va(t), Vb(t), Vc(t)]T , (6)
where the Clarke transformation
T ! 2
3
⎡⎣1 −12 −12
0
√
3
2
−
√
3
2
⎤⎦ . (7)
Then the noise-free signal components in the α-β frame are given by
V ′α (t) =
2Va
3
[
cos (ωt+ φa)− 1
2
cos
(
ωt+ φa − 2
3
π
)
− 1
2
cos
(
ωt+ φa +
2
3
π
)]
! Vα cos (ωt+ φα) , (8)
V ′β (t) =
√
3Va
3
[
cos
(
ωt+ φa − 2
3
π
)
− cos
(
ωt+ φa +
2
3
π
)]
! Vβ cos (ωt+ φβ) . (9)
Considering the noise terms denoted by eα(t) and eβ(t) in the α-β frame, the noisy signals after
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5the transformation can be written as [16],
Vα(t) = Vα cos(tω + φα) + eα(t), (10)
Vβ(t) = Vβ cos(tω + φβ) + eβ(t). (11)
We define the following five state variables including the in-phase and quadrature signals
along with the grid frequency based on (10) and (11) [17] [15]:
x1(t) = Vα cos(tω + φα),
x2(t) = Vα sin(tω + φα),
x3(t) = Vβ cos(tω + φβ), (12)
x4(t) = Vβ sin(tω + φβ),
x5(t) = ω.
Recalling the general model in (1)-(2) and defining the state vector x(k) = [x1(k), x2(k), ..., x5(k)]
T
corresponding to the kth sampling instant, then we can write the following state transition
equation [18]:
x(k + 1) = f (x(k),Δt(k)) +w (k)
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
x1(k) cos
(
x5(k) ·Δt(k)
)− x2(k) sin (x5(k) ·Δt(k))
x1(k) sin
(
x5(k) ·Δt(k)
)
+ x2(k) cos
(
x5(k) ·Δt(k)
)
x3(k) cos
(
x5(k) ·Δt(k)
)− x4(k) sin (x5(k) ·Δt(k))
x3(k) cos
(
x5(k) ·Δt(k)
)
+ x4(k) sin
(
x5(k) ·Δt(k)
)
(1− ε)x5(k)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
+w(k). (13)
It is assumed that the process noise w(k) under both normal and faulty conditions is white
Gaussian with covariance matrix W , i.e., w(k) ∼ N (0,W ). The parameter ε characterizes the
slowly time-varying characteristic of the grid frequency.
Define y(k) = [Vα(k), Vβ(k)]
T . The measurement equation in (2) can then be written as
y(k) = h0(x(k)) + v(k)
! Hx(k) + v(k), (14)
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6where the measurement noise v(k) ∼ N (0,R), and is uncorrelated with w(k), and
H !
⎡⎣1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
⎤⎦ . (15)
B. Models for Typical Attacks
In this paper, three typical attacks in a power grid are considered. Under each attack, the
measurement equation varies while the state transition equation remains the same as (13).
1) Denial of Service Attack: A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is a cyber-attack which occurs
when some components or resources become unavailable due to external adversaries. The DoS
attack can be triggered by flooding the system with superfluous requests, which jams the
communication channel and prevents legitimate data from being transmitted. In a smart grid, the
DoS attack is modeled as the lack of measurement data at the central controller [19]. Thus, the
observed signal at the controller is characterized by a Gaussian noise u(k) with mean 0 and
covariance U , i.e.,
y(k) = h1(x(k)) + v(k)
! u(k). (16)
Note that, in general, the values of U and R may not be the same.
2) Random Attack: The random attack is modeled by an additive term, ya(k), which manip-
ulates the original meter readings at the sampling instant k as
y(k) = h2(x(k)) + v(k)
! Hx(k) + ya(k) + v(k). (17)
We consider it an attack event of interest when ‖ya(k)‖2 ≥ a0, where a0 is a predetermined
lower bound on the magnitude of an attack.
3) False Data Injection Attack: The false data injection attack is induced when the compro-
mised meters forge the events that do not occur. Assume that the attacker knows the topology of
a power system and can control a subset of meters from different buses that are affected by the
attack for the kth measurement. Now consider the attack affecting a given bus. The measurement
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7model under attack at the given bus is [10]
y(k) = h3(x(k)) + v(k)
! Hx(k) +  (k)ya(k) + v(k), (18)
where  (k) = 1 if the given bus is attacked at time k, and  (k) = 0 otherwise, and ya(k) is
the malicious input from the attacker. Comparing (17) and (18), it is seen that the false data
injection attack can be intermittent whereas the random attack is persistent.
C. Problem Statement
To jointly estimate the state of the bus and detect an attack based on voltage measurements,
the controller needs to address the following problems.
1) State Estimation: The state variable x(k) cannot be measured directly. We need to estimate
x(k) based on all the measurements Y (k) ! [y(1),y(2)...,y(k − 1),y(k)] reported by the meter
at that bus.
2) Detection Rule: Our goal is to detect any attack as quickly as possible. After obtaining
the state estimate at each sampling instant, according to a specific detection rule, the controller
needs to make a decision on whether to trigger the attack alarm immediately or take more
measurements to update the state estimate.
3) Sampling Interval Adaptation: Since the traditional uniform sampling strategy may lead to
extensive measurements and high communication load between the controller and local meters,
we propose to reduce the number of measurements by adjusting the sampling interval Δt(k)
adaptively. The basic idea is to maintain a large sampling interval during the normal operation
and reduce the sampling interval upon observing irregular fluctuations.
III. SMC-BASED STATE ESTIMATION AND ATTACK DETECTION
The proposed framework for state estimation and attack detection is illustrated in Fig. 1. The
voltage readings from a certain bus are sequentially fed to the controller that runs the proposed
SMC filtering algorithm. In particular, the SMC filter iteratively estimates the distribution of the
state vector. The estimated state is then fed to a CUSUM change detector to detect the attack. If
no attack alarm is triggered, the controller adjusts the sampling interval and waits for the next
measurement.
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Fig. 1. Flow chart of the proposed online detector of attacks on bus meters based on voltage measurement.
In the following subsections, we first present the SMC-based algorithm to estimate the system
state given the sampling interval Δt(k), and then specify the CUSUM-based attack detection
rule. Finally, we present a strategy to adaptively adjust Δt(k) to reduce the measurement cost
and the communication load between the meter and the controller.
A. State Estimation via SMC Algorithm
Our proposed attack detection approach is based on the state estimation by the SMC method.
In SMC [20], a set of weighted samples are used to approximate an underlying distribution that
is to be estimated. And the samples and their associated weights are sequentially updated based
on the new measurements.
The proposed SMC-based state estimator is summarized in Algorithm 1. The algorithmic
details are presented as follows.
• Initialization
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9Algorithm 1 SMC-based State Estimator
1: Initialization: k = 0, draw N samples,
{
x(j)(0)
}N
j=1
, according to the prior distribution
N (x0,Σ0). Set the weight wj(0) = 1/N for all j.
2: for k = 1, 2, ... do
3: Generate the current samples x(j)(k) according to (21).
4: Update the weight wj(k) according to (22) and normalize it.
5: Compute the state and error estimates, x̂(k) and e(k), according to (24) and (25).
6: Perform resampling if N̂eff is below a given threshold.
7: end for
For k = 0, draw N initial samples,
{
x(j)(0)
}N
j=1
, from the prior probability density function
characterized by x0 and Σ0, i.e.,
x(j)(0) ∼ N (x0,Σ0), j = 1, 2, ..., N. (19)
Set initial weights wj(0) = 1/N for all j.
• Online State Estimation
During the online phase, the controller sequentially updates the state estimate. An SMC update
step consists of sample generation, weight update, and resampling, as highlighted in Algorithm
1.
1) Sample generation: The basic idea of SMC is to perform the sequential importance
sampling (SIS). At each time, N samples
{
x(j)(0)
}N
j=1
are drawn from some trial distribution
π
(
x(j)(k)|X(j)(k − 1),Y (k)) with X(j)(k − 1) ! {x(j)(1),x(j)(2), ...,x(j)(k − 1)}. Here we
choose the state transition density as the trial distribution, i.e.,
π
(
x(j)(k)|X(j)(k − 1),Y (k)) ! p(x(j)(k)|x(j)(k − 1)). (20)
Hence according to (13),
x(j)(k) ∼ N (f(x(j)(k − 1),Δt(k − 1)),W ) . (21)
2) Weight update: The corresponding weight wj(k) for sample x(j)(k) is calculated by
wj(k) ∝ wj(k − 1)p(y(k)|x
(j)(k))p(x(j)(k)|x(j)(k − 1))
π(x(j)(k)|X(j)(k − 1),Y (k))
∝ wj(k − 1)p
(
y(k)|x(j)(k))
∝ wj(k − 1) · exp
[
−1
2
(
y(k)−Hx(j)(k))T R−1 (y(k)−Hx(j)(k))] , (22)
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where the normalized weight wj(k) is given as
wj(k) =
wj(k)∑N
j=1wj(k)
. (23)
Given the current weighted samples {x(j)(k), wj(k)}Nj=1, we can estimate the state vector and
the error vector as
x̂(k) =
N∑
j=1
wj(k)x
(j)(k), (24)
e(k) =
N∑
j=1
wj(k)
[
y(k)−Hx(j)(k)]. (25)
3) Resampling: The resampling step aims to avoid the problem of degeneracy of the SMC
algorithm, that is, the situation that all but one of the importance weights are close to zero [21]
[22]. The basic solution is to retain the samples with high weights and discard the samples with
low weights.
The resampling is implemented only when the effective number of particles Neff is below a
predetermined threshold Nthr. An estimate of Neff is given by
N̂eff =
1∑N
i=1 (wj(k))
2
, (26)
which reflects the variation of the weights [21]. If N̂eff is less than a given threshold, Nthr, we
perform resampling to obtain N new samples,
{
x˜(j)(k)
}N
j=1
, with equal weights w˜j(k) = 1/N .
That is, draw N samples from the current sample set with probabilities proportional to the
corresponding weights.
B. Attack Detection via CUSUM Test
As given by (14)-(18), the statistical models for measurements before and after the attack
occurrence are the basis to formulate a change detection problem which aims at the quickest
reaction to the sudden change [23] [24]. The basic strategy is to utilize the sequential mea-
surements to achieve high time resolution, and thus minimize the detection delay subject to the
constraint on the false alarm period. At the kth sampling instant, the detector takes the current
measurement y(k), and computes a decision statistic gk, based on which it decides whether or
not to declare an attack.
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To facilitate the description of the proposed detection rule, we first write the conditional
probability density functions of measurements corresponding to the null hypothesis θ0 and the
alternative hypothesis θa ∈ {θ1, θ2, θ3} (θ1 for DoS attack, θ2 for random attack, and θ3 for false
data injection attack) as
pθ0 (y(k) |x(k)) =
1√
(2π)2 (detR0)
exp
(−1
2
εTk,θ0R0
−1εk,θ0
)
, (27)
pθ1 (y(k) |x(k)) =
1√
(2π)2 (detR1)
exp
(−1
2
εTk,θ1R
−1
1 εk,θ1
)
, θa = θ1 (28)
pθ2 (y(k) |x(k),ya(k)) =
1√
(2π)2 (detR2)
exp
(−1
2
εTk,θ2R
−1
2 εk,θ2
)
, θa = θ2 (29)
pθ3 (y(k) |x(k),ya(k), (k)) =
1√
(2π)2 (detR3)
exp
(−1
2
εTk,θ3R
−1
3 εk,θ3
)
, θa = θ3 (30)
where
εk,θ0 ! y(k)−Hx(k), (31)
εk,θ1 ! y(k), (32)
εk,θ2 ! y(k)−Hx(k)− ya(k), (33)
εk,θ3 ! y(k)−Hx(k)−  (k)ya(k), (34)
and {R0, ...,R3} denote the corresponding covariances. Given the models in (14)-(18), R0 =
R2 = R3 = R and R1 = V .
For each attack type θa ∈ {θ1, θ2, θ3}, the occurrence of the attack can be detected at time T
via the following sequential change detection procedure, called CUSUM test [23],
gk = (gk−1 + lk)
+, (35)
T = inf {k : gk ≥ λ} , (36)
where
lk =
1
2
ln
det (R0)
det (Ra)
+
1
2
εTk,θ0R0
−1εk,θ0−
1
2
εTk,θaR
−1
a εk,θa , (37)
with Ra ∈ {R1,R2,R3} denoting the covariance under different alternative hypotheses, and λ
is a threshold.
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Given a predetermined false alarm period γ, the threshold is approximated by λ ≈ ln γ [23].
In our case of attack detection, the stopping time T is the first time that gk exceeds the threshold,
indicating the occurrence of an attack and terminating the current detection cycle.
Since the true state x(k), the exact value of ya(k) or  (k) are unknown, we need to replace
the terms εk,θ0 and εk,θa in (37) with their estimates based on the output of the SMC state
estimator, i.e.,
ε̂i,θ0 = y(k)−Hx̂(k), (38)
ε̂i,θ1 = y(k), θa = θ1, (39)
ε̂i,θ2 = y(k)−Hx̂(k)− ŷa(k), θa = θ2, (40)
ε̂i,θ3 = y(k)−Hx̂(k)−¤" (k)ya(k), θa = θ3, (41)
where x̂(k) is given in (1).
For the random attack model in (40), the attack sequence ya(k) is estimated as
ŷa(k) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩e(k), ‖e(k)‖
2 ≥ a0
√
2
2
[a0, a0]
T ‖e(k)‖2 < a0
(42)
with e(k) given in (25). (42) implies that the attack sequence is approximated by the estimation
error e(k) as long as ‖e(k)‖2 exceeds the lower bound of the attack magnitude of interest.
For the false attack model in (41), the attack term  (k)ya(k) is estimated as
¤"
 (k)ya(k) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
e(k), if ‖e(k)‖2 ≥ a0 and −12 ε̂Ti,θ3R−13 ε̂i,θ3
∣∣∣ÿ" (k)ya(k)=e(k) > −12 ε̂Ti,θ0R−13 ε̂i,θ0
√
2
2
[a0, a0]
T if ‖e(k)‖2 < a0 and − 12 ε̂Ti,θ3R−13 ε̂i,θ3
∣∣∣ÿ" (k)ŷa(k)=√22 [a0,a0]T > −12 ε̂Ti,θ0R−13 ε̂i,θ0
0, otherwise.
(43)
The estimator in (43) ensures that, given the kth sample, the bus is estimated as normal or
attacked such that l̂k is maximized.
C. Adaptive Sampling Strategy
Conventionally, the sampling interval Δt(k) is a constant, i.e., Δt(k) = Δ for all k. Here
we propose an adaptive sampling strategy that adjusts the next sampling interval based on past
observations. Intuitively, the sampling interval should be relatively large when the system is
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under normal operation and it should quickly decrease when an attack is perceived as likely. To
that end, we adopt the idea from the congestion control for the network transmission control
protocol (TCP), i.e., the additive increase/multiplicative decrease scheme for obtaining a proper
data package size [25]. Specifically, the proposed sampling method has two phases described as
follows.
1) Normal Operation Phase (Initialization): During the normal operation, we aim to quickly
find a default sampling interval which balances between the resource cost and the measurement
resolution. Suppose that the minimum achievable sampling interval is Tm. We start with the
sampling interval Δt(i = 0) = Tm, and Δt(i) is doubled after each measurement i as long as
the error does not exceed a predetermined threshold, d0, i.e.,
Δt(i+ 1) = 2×Δt(i), if ‖e(i)‖2 ≤ d0, i = 0, 1, 2, ... (44)
where e(i) is given by (25). Denote the maximum sampling interval satisfying (44) as Δt0,
which is set as the default sampling interval under normal operation.
2) Online Attack Detection Phase: When the controller believes that the estimation error is
reasonable for normal operations, the sampling interval can be increased as
Δt(k + 1) = min {
a×Δt0 +Δt(k), b×Δt0} , if ‖e(k)‖2 ≤ d1, k = 0, 1, 2, ... (45)
where the function 
x rounds x to the nearest multiple of Tm, the coefficient a < 1 determines
the growth rate of the sampling interval, b > 1 is a predetermined integer defining the upper
bound of the interval to ensure the detection performance, and the threshold d1 > d0.
When the controller observes the potential of an attack occurrence, it should increase the
sampling frequency significantly to achieve higher measurement resolution until an attack alarm
is triggered, i.e.,
Δt(k + 1) = max {
c×Δt(k), Tm} , if ‖e(k)‖2 > d2, k = 0, 1, 2, ... (46)
where d2 > d1 is the threshold, the coefficient c < 1 controls the decreasing rate and the sampling
interval cannot be further refined when Tm is reached.
After detecting the attack, the sampling interval is reset to the default value Δt0, and adjusted
by (45) and (46) in the next cycle.
Fig. 2 illustrates an example of the proposed adaptive sampling method, where the coefficients,
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the adaptive sampling strategy.
a = 0.4, b = 3 and c = 0.6, with three thresholds, d0 = 1.5 × 10−5, d1 = 2 × 10−5 and d2 =
3×10−5. In the initialization phase, the default sampling interval Δt0 = 8Tm is quickly reached
in the third step. In the online phase, the sampling interval rises from 8Tm to 3Δt0 = 24Tm.
When a large deviation is observed in the 8th step, the sampling interval is adjusted to 3Tm after
the 12th sample.
Finally, the complete procedure of our proposed attack detection method is summarized in
Algorithm 3.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the performance of the proposed method in detecting typical attacks
at a given bus in a power system, i.e., denial of service attacks, random attacks and false data
injection attacks.
For each type of attacks, we first present the estimation performance of SMC, and then
examine the delay performance of the proposed attack detector with the adaptive sampling
scheme. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, we also compare its delay
performance with that of the extended-Kalman-filter-based estimation method [15] in combina-
tion with conventional attack detectors [10]. Finally, we evaluate the amount of resource saved
by the proposed adaptive sampling strategy. Note that, for a fair comparison, the average delay
given a certain false alarm period is measured by the equivalent number of samples between the
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Algorithm 2 Proposed Attack Detector
1: Initialization:
2: Obtain the default sampling interval Δt0 given d0 according to (44).
3: For SMC, obtain the initial samples {x(j)(0)}Nj=1, and set the threshold for resampling.
4: For the CUSUM test, set the lower bound for an attack of interest, a0, and the attack
decision thresholds, λ.
5: For the sampling interval adaptation, set the coefficients, a, b and c, and the thresholds,
d1 and d2.
6: Online attack detection:
7: for k = 1, 2, ... do,
8: 1) Take the kth measurement.
9: 2) Run one step of SMC update in Algorithm 1.
10: 3) Compute gk as in (35).
11: if gk ≥ λ then
12: Trigger the attack alarm and break the loop.
13: else
14: Update the next sampling interval Δt(k) according to (45) and (46).
15: end if
16: Wait Δt(k).
17: k = k + 1.
18: Loop back to Line 8.
19: end for
attack occurrence and the attack alert using the default sampling frequency Δt0 1.
A. Simulation Setup
In our experiments, we simulate different types of faults in a power system using Matlab.
The detailed setups to implement the proposed method and other methods for comparison are
described below.
1) Proposed Method: A sinusoidal voltage signal with random Gaussian noise is generated.
For the system model, the amplitudes of the three-phase voltage signal Va = Vb = Vc = 1, and
the initial phase angles, φa, φb and φc, are set as 0, −2π3 and 2π3 , respectively. The grid frequency
f0 linearly varies from 60Hz to 60.5Hz to examine the adaptation to frequency variations. The
covariance matrix of the process noise W =
⎡⎣ σ2I4×4 0
0 10−7
⎤⎦, where σ2 is set to 10−3 or
10−5 for comparison, and I4×4 is the 4× 4 identity matrix. The parameter ε reflecting the slow
varying of the grid frequency is set to 10−16. The measurement noise covariances, R = 10−3I2×2
1Suppose the time interval between the attack occurrence and the alarm is Tdelay , the delay is measured by Nsample =
Tdelay/Δt0.
November 15, 2017 DRAFT
16
and U = 1.5 × 10−3I2×2. The nominal fundamental frequency f0 = 60Hz, and the sampling
frequency of local meters fm = 1/Tm = 106Hz.
For the SMC algorithm, the number of particles before and after resampling are set as
N = 500. The initial samples {x(j)(0)}Nj=1 are draw from The prior probability density function
N (x0,Σ0) where x0 = [0, 0, 0, 0, 60]T , and Σ0 =
⎡⎣ I4×4 0
0 10−7
⎤⎦. The lower bound for
classifying an attack of interest is set as a0 = 1.5× σ with different process noise covariances.
For the adaptive sampling strategy, the coefficients for sampling interval adjustment are set as
a = 0.4, b = 3, and c = 0.6. During the initialization, the threshold d0 = 1.5 × σ in (44). For
the online interval adjustment, d1 = 2×σ and d2 = 3×σ. Under the uniform sampling method,
the sampling interval is fixed to Δt0.
2) Methods for Comparison: To tackle the nonlinear estimation problem, the methods in [15]
utilizes the extended Kalman filter (EKF). We compare the estimation result with that of the
EKF to demonstrate the higher accuracy of our SMC method.
To evaluate the performance of attack detection, we compare our CUSUM-based detector with
conventional ones [10], namely, the χ2 detector and Euclidean distance detector, under uniform
sampling with the sampling interval fixed to Δt0. Moreover, the performance of another detector
based on the well-known likelihood ratio test with adaptive sampling is also compared. Note
that the following detection methods do not need prior knowledge about the attack patterns, and
can trigger an alarm without differentiating the attack type.
χ2 Detector: The χ2 detector computes the chi-square distributed statistic χ2(k) ! e(k)TS(k)−1e(k),
where the residual covariance matrix S(k) is computed as
S(k) =
N∑
j=1
[
Hx(j)(k)− ŷ(k)] [Hx(j)(k)− ŷ(k)]T . (47)
with
ŷ(k) =
N∑
j=1
Hx(j)(k). (48)
Then a χ2 test [10] will declare the occurrence of an attack after the kth0 sample with
k0 = min
{
k : χ2(k) ≥ λ1
}
, (49)
where λ1 = χ2d=1(η) is the detection threshold with 1− η denoting the target level of confidence
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and the degrees of freedom d = 2− 1 = 1.
Euclidean-Distance (E-D) Detector: Since the false data injection attack can be carefully
crafted to pass conventional statistical detection, e.g., χ2 detector, another detection rule based
on the Euclidean distance metric is proposed in [10]. Here we adopt a windowed Euclidean
distance measure among the past W true voltage measurements, {Vi(k −W + 1), ..., Vi(k)},
and the corresponding estimated values,
{
V˜i(k −W + 1), ..., V˜i(k)
}
, of phase i ∈ {a, b, c},
reconstructed from the state estimates, i.e.,
d(Vi, V˜i, k) =
√√√√ k∑
k′=k−W+1
(
Vi(k′)− V˜i(k′)
)
. (50)
An attack alarm is triggered after the kth0 sample with
k0 = min
{
k : d(Vi, V˜i, k) ≥ λ2
}
, ∀i ∈ {a, b, c}. (51)
Log-likelihood-ratio (LLR) Detector: This windowed detection rule takes the latest W
likelihood-ratio evaluations into account. Given a threshold λ3, the decision of an attack is
made after the kth0 sample where
k0 = min
{
k :
k∑
k′=k−W+1
l̂k′ ≥ λ3
}
, (52)
For a fair comparison of the detection performance, the thresholds, λ (for our method), λ1,
λ2 and λ3 (for the conventional detectors in [10], and the LLR detector), are tuned to satisfy
the same target false alarm periods. The window sizes for both the E-D detector and the LLR
detector are set as W = 10.
B. Detection of DoS Attack
To simulate the DoS attack, the controller is prevented from observing the upcoming local
measurements after the attack which occurs at t = 0.05s and lasts for the following 0.05s. To
illustrate the estimation process, the estimated sinusoid output in phase a, V̂a(t) (reconstructed
from the state variables), is presented in Fig. 3, in comparison with the true input voltage signal
given the large measurement noise (σ2 = 10−3). Before the attack occurrence at t = 0.05s, the
estimated values by the SMC algorithm closely track the true signal. After t = 0.05s, the gap
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between the estimated signal and the true signals becomes obvious. It can be observed that the
estimate by the EKF generally results in larger errors in comparison with our SMC method.
We evaluate the average attack detection delay performance of different methods as a function
of the false alarm period γ (in terms of the equivalent number of samples under default sampling
frequency). The delay was the average of 5000 simulations. Fig. 4 (a) and (b) shows the average
delay performances for detecting the DoS attack with different process noises. On one hand,
given a specific false alarm period, the proposed algorithm with uniform sampling intervals has
the shortest average delays in both cases, implying higher efficiency of our method. On the
other hand, when the sampling interval Δ(k) is adaptively adjusted, the delay performance is
only affected slightly. Even given a large false alarm period which is the desired case for real
applications, the difference between the two sampling strategies is still very small. Compared
with the EKF-based χ2 detector with uniform sampling and the LLR-test detector, the proposed
approach has less average delays given the same false alarm periods even with adaptive sampling.
Fig. 5 illustrates the adaptive sampling process by showing the average length of the sampling
interval during different time periods (false alarm period γ = 103). For each time period specified
in the legend, the average sampling interval T x is obtained by computing the ratio between the
length of the specified time period Tx, and the total number of samples at the controller, nx,
during the corresponding period, i.e., T x = Tx/nx. Before the attack occurs, the controller starts
with the default sampling frequency (after initialization), and the sampling interval under normal
operation is around 20Tm. After the attack occurrence, the controller quickly shrinks the sampling
interval to increase the measurement resolution. For the last 5 samples before the detection
decision is made, the sampling interval gets closer to the smallest sampling period corresponding
to the highest achievable sampling frequency of the local meter (Δt(k) = 2.3Tm∼ 2.5Tm). By
comparing results under different measurement noises, we can conclude that the average sampling
interval is larger in general when the noise level is lower.
As shown in Table I, the amount of resource saving by the adaptive sampling is evaluated based
on the average sampling interval, T a = 12
(
T normal + T attack
)
, in comparison with the uniform
sampling approach. Explicitly, the resource saving percentage is given by
(
1− Tm/T a
)×100%.
For different process noise levels (σ2 = 10−3 and 10−5), the percentages of resource saving are
all above 92.3% with different false alarm periods. In general, the adaptive sampling method
can save more resources when the measurement noise is low, which agrees with our observation
in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 3. Estimates of Va(t) by SMC and EKF under the DoS attack (σ2 = 10−3).
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(a) Detection delay for DoS attacks (σ2 = 10−5).
101 102 103 104
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
False alarm period
A
ve
ra
ge
 d
al
ay
 
 
()* with *+(+),-.-"!(uniform sampling)
()* with *+(+),-.-"!(adaptive sampling)
()* with /0"0LLR test(adaptive sampling)
 #&'with the 2-test (uniform sampling)
(b) Detection delay for DoS attacks (σ2 = 10−3).
Fig. 4. Comparison of detection delay performances under DoS attacks.
TABLE I
PERCENTAGE OF RESOURCE SAVING BY ADAPTIVE SAMPLING UNDER DOS ATTACKS.
γ
Resource saving
σ2 = 10−5 σ2 = 10−3
102 93.6% 92.6%
5× 102 93.3% 92.4%
103 93.1% 92.3%
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Fig. 5. Average sampling intervals for detecting DoS attacks under different noise conditions.
C. Detection of Random Attack
Since the the random attack occurs when the controller obtains manipulated measurement data
rather than the true local observations, in our simulation, the faulty signals can be generated by
adding an attack vector ya(k) to the original observations. The attack sequence for Va(t), Vb(t)
and Vc(t) are sequentially generated by 1.5 cos((2π × 65)tk − π/4), where tk denotes the time
instant for the kth measurement, and is transformed into α− β space accordingly to obtain the
attack sequence ya(k). Note that all the observations from Va(t), Vb(t) and Vc(t) are affected by
the same attack sequence simultaneously.
Fig. 6 shows the estimated Va(t), where the continuous attack takes effect after t = 0.05s,
i.e., all the following observations at controller are distorted by the attack. Similar to Fig. 3, the
attack results in an abrupt gap between the estimated and the true signals, and our SMC-based
method leads to smaller errors.
The average delay performance for detecting the random attack is shown in Fig. 7 (a) and (b)
under different levels of measurement noise. Again, the proposed adaptive sampling performs
similarly to uniform sampling, and exhibits less detection delays in comparison with the EKF-
based method using χ2 detector. Compared with the result for detecting the DoS attack, the
delay becomes larger in general, which coincides with our observation from Fig. 6 where the
differences between the estimated signal under attack and the normal input signal are generally
smaller than that in Fig. 3.
Fig. 8 shows the average length of the sampling interval during the corresponding time period.
Similar to Fig. 5, the controller tends to maintain a large sampling interval during the normal
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Fig. 6. Estimates of Va(t) by SMC and EKF under the random attack (σ2 = 10−3).
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(a) Detection delay for random attacks σ2 = 10−5.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of detection delay performances under random attacks.
operation and quickly reduces the interval after the attack occurrence. Table II demonstrates
that a great amount of resource can be saved by implementing the adaptive sampling method
(>92.1%).
D. Detection of False Data Injection Attack
The simulated data injection sequence is generated by ya(k + 1) = ya(k) + z, where the
random elements in z are independently generated from the uniform distribution in [0.05, 0.15]
and the initial attack vector is [0, 0]T . Note that false data injection differs from the previous two
November 15, 2017 DRAFT
22
0
5
10
15
20
25
A
ve
ra
ge
 s
am
pl
in
g 
in
te
rv
al
 (T
m
)
 
 
Initialization
Normal operation
After the attack
Last 5 samples before the decision
2=10-5 2=10-3
Fig. 8. Average sampling intervals for detecting random walk attacks under different noise conditions.
TABLE II
PERCENTAGE OF RESOURCE SAVING BY ADAPTIVE SAMPLING UNDER RANDOM ATTACKS.
γ
Resource saving
σ2 = 10−5 σ2 = 10−3
102 93.5% 92.7%
5× 102 93.3% 92.5%
103 93.0% 92.1%
types of attacks as the obtained measurements at the controller at different sampling instants can
be either normal or faulty after the first attack occurrence, depending on whether the current
state variable is affected by the attack. In our simulation, the value of the indicator function
 (k) at different sampling instant are independently generated from the binomial distribution,
such that  (k) = 1 with probability of p = 0.8.
The estimation result is shown in Fig. 9, where the estimate of Va(t) gradually deviates from
the true signal after the attack occurrence at t = 0.05s. Compared with the previous two types of
attacks, the gap between the estimates and the true signals under the false data injection attack
does not become obvious until t = 0.06, implying a longer detection delay.
Fig. 10 (a) and (b) show the average delay performance for detecting the false data injection
attack given different measurement noises. In response to the attack occurrence at t = 0.05s, the
proposed method outperforms the others with less delays given the same false alarm period and
the adaptive sampling scheme. Fig. 11 summaries the average sampling interval for detecting
the false data injection attack, where we can observe that the average interval is smaller than
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Fig. 9. Estimates of Va(t) by SMC and EKF under the false data injection attack (σ2 = 10−3).
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(a) Detection delay for false data injection attacks σ2 = 10−5.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of detection delay performances under false data injection attacks.
that for the other two types of attack in general. Table. III presents the result of the average
resource saving, where the values varies from 92.0% to 92.9% under difference conditions.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a joint SMC-based state estimation and CUSUM change detection method
that quickly detects different attacks at a three-phase bus in a smart grid. The proposed SMC
filtering tracks the non-linear state-space model when the grid frequency is slowing drifting, and
the CUSUM-type detector can be adapted to various unknown attack patterns. Considering the
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Fig. 11. Average sampling intervals for detecting false data injection attacks under different noise conditions.
TABLE III
PERCENTAGE OF RESOURCE SAVING BY ADAPTIVE SAMPLING UNDER FALSE DATA INJECTION ATTACKS.
γ
Resource saving
σ2 = 10−5 σ2 = 10−3
102 92.9% 92.6%
5× 102 92.7% 92.2%
103 92.6% 92.0%
resource cost on sampling and communication, an adaptive sampling strategy is proposed such
that the controller adjusts the sampling interval based on the bus state estimation. The proposed
method is implemented to detect three typical attacks in a power system, and compared with
existing methods. The simulation results demonstrate that our method can quickly detect various
faults without any prior knowledge. Furthermore, the proposed adaptive sampling strategy reduces
the rate of taking measurements significantly while the detection delay is almost unaffected,
which makes it suitable to be applied in real power grids.
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